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Comment  David Romer
This is an excellent chapter. The issue it addresses—whether globaliza-
tion has the potential to reduce or even eliminate the ability of a domestic 
central bank to inﬂ  uence domestic economic developments—is already 
David Romer is the Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy at the University of 
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being debated, and is likely to become increasingly important as economic 
integration continues. Most previous analyses of this issue by both non-
economists (e.g., Fisher 2006) and economists (e.g., Ball 2006; Rogoﬀ 2006) 
have been relatively informal. This chapter’s formal analysis is a signiﬁ  -
cant step forward. The chapter’s organization around the IS, LM, and AS 
relationships (and its clear separation of the issues involving each of those 
relationships) is sensible and insightful. The comprehensive discussion of a 
wide range of ways that globalization might aﬀect the central bank’s abil-
ity to inﬂ  uence the economy is very valuable, and the focus on extreme 
cases is a powerful way of clarifying the issues and of identifying problems 
with many earlier analyses. Finally, I agree with virtually all of Woodford’s 
conclusions.
In my comments, I want to focus on one narrow area where I disagree with 
Woodford’s conclusions, and where it appears that globalization does have 
the potential to signiﬁ  cantly reduce the central bank’s ability to inﬂ  uence the 
economy. In section 1.2.2 of his chapter, as part of his analysis of possible 
eﬀects of globalization on the LM curve, Woodford discusses the possibil-
ity of multiple currencies circulating in a country. He concludes that unless 
the currencies are perfect substitutes, this development would not aﬀect the 
domestic central bank’s ability to control inﬂ  ation. This seems counterintui-
tive. If many prices are not being quoted in units of domestic currency and 
many transactions are not being carried out using domestic currency, one 
would think the central bank’s ability to aﬀect how rapidly prices are rising 
would be reduced.
The reason Woodford reaches his conclusion is simple: he focuses on the 
central bank’s ability to inﬂ  uence the price level measured in units of domestic 
currency. Because the central bank can control the value of domestic cur-
rency even in a highly globalized economy, it can continue to control this 
measure of inﬂ  ation. But while there may be reasons to be interested in inﬂ  a-
tion measured this way, one might also be interested in inﬂ  ation measured 
as an appropriate weighted average of the change in each price in units of 
whatever currency in which it is quoted. Because the central bank does not 
determine the values of foreign currencies, it is not clear it can control this 
measure of inﬂ  ation in a highly globalized economy.
I therefore want to discuss how the circulation of multiple currencies 
aﬀects the central bank’s ability to inﬂ  uence this measure of inﬂ  ation. The 
main thing I will do is present and analyze a simple model of this issue. At 
the end, I will brieﬂ  y discuss the question of which measure of inﬂ  ation is 
likely to be more important to the central bank. To preview, I ﬁ  nd that if glo-
balization really does proceed that far, central banks’ ability to achieve their 
objectives may be substantially constrained. I also ﬁ  nd that the constraint 
is asymmetric: the circulation of multiple currencies limits a central bank’s 
ability to achieve higher inﬂ  ation than other countries much more than it 
limits its ability to achieve lower inﬂ  ation. As a result, whether the constraint Globalization and Monetary Control    7 9
is good or bad depends largely on the reliability of central banks. To the 
extent they are prone to follow high- inﬂ  ation policies when they should not, 
the constraint is potentially valuable. But to the extent they sometimes wish 
to achieve higher inﬂ  ation than other countries for legitimate reasons, the 
constraint is harmful.
Assumptions
I am interested in the central bank’s ability to control the average level of 
inﬂ  ation. I therefore focus on the steady state of a ﬂ  exible price model. The 
model is set in discrete time. Each period, households consume a continuum 
of diﬀerentiated goods. There is no international trade, so all goods that 
households consume are produced domestically, and domestic producers 
do not sell abroad.
Households’ consumption preferences are described by the usual constant 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution form over time, and the usual con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) form at a point in time. That is:
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where Ct(i) is the household’s consumption of good i in period t. The real 
interest rate is exogenous, constant, and equal to households’ rate of time 
preference: r    .
Money enters the model because households face a cash- in- advance con-
straint on purchases of goods. There are two currencies in the economy, 
“pesos” and “dollars.” Pesos are issued by the domestic central bank, while 
dollars are not. I therefore treat the rate of peso inﬂ  ation (i.e., the rate at 
which prices quoted in pesos rise) as a choice variable of the central bank, 
and the rate of dollar inﬂ  ation as exogenous. I denote the two inﬂ  ation 
rates by  P and  $, respectively. Because I focus on steady states, both are 
constant.
Each producer can post its price and accept payment in either pesos or 
dollars. To buy from a given producer, a household must hold the needed 
amount of the relevant currency one period in advance. If we let F denote 
the fraction of prices that are quoted in pesos, then the average rate at which 
prices are rising in this economy—which is the inﬂ  ation measure I will focus 
on—is:
(2)      F P   (1   F) $.80    Michael  Woodford
We can rewrite this as
(3)       $   F ,
where   is the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential,  P –    $.
All ﬁ  rms produce using the same constant returns to scale technology. 
There are no cash-  in-  advance constraints for payments to factors of pro-
duction, and factor payments and ﬁ  rm revenues can be used immediately in 
foreign exchange and asset markets. Thus in any period, all producers have 
the same marginal cost.
A key assumption is that each producer faces a cost of conducting busi-
ness in dollars rather than pesos. This cost is heterogeneous across produc-
ers, and it may be negative. It is easiest to think of it as a direct utility cost. 
A highly patriotic producer may be very reluctant to do business in dollars; 
another producer may prefer to use dollars all else equal; and so on.
We will see that when peso inﬂ  ation is greater relative to dollar inﬂ  ation, 
the demand for goods priced in pesos relative to the demand for goods priced 
in dollars is lower. The heterogeneous cost of using dollars therefore causes 
the fraction of ﬁ  rms that price in pesos to be a decreasing function of the 
inﬂ  ation diﬀerential. That is,
(4)  F   F( ), F ( )  0.
Currency Competition, Inﬂ  ation, and Distortions
With a cash- in- advance constraint, the eﬀective price of a good to house-
holds depends on the inﬂ  ation rate. With two currencies with diﬀering inﬂ  a-
tion rates, the result is a distortion of households’ choices toward goods sold 
in the lower inﬂ  ation currency.
To see how the distortion operates, let Pt
P and Pt
$ be the prices charged 
by the producer of a representative “peso good” and the producer of a 
representative “dollar good” in period t. If a household decides to buy one 
unit less of a peso good in period t, it needs Pt
P fewer pesos in period t –  1. It 
can use those pesos to purchase Pt
P/  εt– 1 dollars in period t –   1, where ε is the 
exchange rate (i.e., the price of dollars in pesos), and then use those dollars 
to buy Pt
P/ (εt– 1Pt
$) units of a dollar good in period t. Because the producers 
of peso goods and dollar goods face the same marginal cost and the same 
elasticity of demand (and since they face no cash-  in-  advance constraint), 
they charge the same price. That is, Pt
P and Pt
$ are related by
(5)  Pt
P   εtPt
$.
Thus for households, the price of a peso good relative to a dollar good 
is εt/ε(t– 1). And since (5) holds each period, εt/  ε(t– 1) is determined by the 
diﬀerence in the inﬂ  ation rates.1
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This analysis shows that diﬀerences in inﬂ  ation between the two cur-
rencies produce diﬀerences in the eﬀective prices that households face for 
diﬀerent goods, and thus diﬀerences in their purchases. These diﬀerences 
have no counterpart in the social opportunity costs of producing the goods. 
That is, diﬀerential inﬂ  ation creates distortions.
The welfare cost of these distortions is approximately equal to a constant 
times the variance of (log) relative prices faced by households. With fraction 
F of goods priced in pesos and the remainder in dollars, this variance is
(8)  V   F( )[1   F( )] 2.
It is useful to rewrite this as
(9)  V   [ F( )]2
1   F( )
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The distortions from diﬀerent purchases of peso and dollar goods are zero 
if all goods are priced in dollars (F   0), if all goods are priced in pesos 
(F   1), or if the two inﬂ  ation rates are the same (    0). For a given  , they 
are greatest when F   1/  2; for a given F, they are increasing in the absolute 
value of  .
Currency Competition and Inﬂ  ation Control
Recall that the measure of inﬂ  ation I focus on—the average rate of 
increase of prices, in whatever currencies they are quoted in—is      $   
F( ) , where   is the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential,  P –    $ (see [3]). One can use 
this expression, together with equation (9) for the variance of relative prices 
caused by diﬀerential inﬂ  ation, to establish the following results. Through-
out, I assume that strictly positive amounts of both currencies circulate (i.e., 
0   F   1).
Result 1. There may be an upper bound to inﬂ  ation. To see this, recall that 
     $   F( ) . For     0, raising   increases inﬂ  ation by raising the   
term, but lowers it by reducing the F( ) term. For many F( )’s, the second 
eﬀect eventually dominates, so there is maximum inﬂ  ation rate that can be 
attained. The numerical example presented later illustrates this possibility.
Result 2. Obtaining inﬂ  ation diﬀerent from foreign inﬂ  ation introduces a 
distortion that is not present under a single currency. This follows from the 82    Michael  Woodford
facts that      $ requires  P    $ and that when  P    $ and 0   F   1, 
V   0.
Result 3. A given departure of inﬂ  ation above foreign inﬂ  ation involves 
greater distortions than the same departure of inﬂ  ation below foreign inﬂ  a-
tion. To see this, consider equation (9) for V. Since      $   F( ) , equal 
departures of inﬂ  ation above and below  $ involve equal and opposite val-
ues of F( ) , and thus the same value of [F( ) ]2. But since F ( )   0, 
[1 –   F( )]/  F( ) is greater for a positive value of   than for a negative value 
of   of equal magnitude.
Result 4. When inﬂ  ation is above foreign inﬂ  ation, if an increase in peso 
inﬂ  ation raises overall inﬂ  ation, it increases distortions. This follows immedi-
ately from (9) and the fact that F ( )   0.
Thus, the only case where raising peso inﬂ  ation further above dollar inﬂ  a-
tion could reduce distortions is when it reduces overall inﬂ  ation. But the cen-
tral bank would never put the economy in that situation: if the economy is at 
a point where  F( ) is decreasing in  , then (as long as F[ ] is smooth) there 
is some lower value of   that yields the same  F( ), and so yields the same 
inﬂ  ation rate with smaller distortions. Thus, result 4 says that the further 
inﬂ  ation is increased above foreign inﬂ  ation, the greater the distortions.
Result 5. When inﬂ  ation is below foreign inﬂ  ation, lowering inﬂ  ation further 
can either raise or lower distortions. Lowering inﬂ  ation further below foreign 
inﬂ  ation requires increasing the magnitude of the diﬀerence between peso 
inﬂ  ation and dollar inﬂ  ation, which acts to raise distortions. But it increases 
the fraction of prices quoted in pesos. If most prices are already quoted in 
pesos, this acts to lower distortions. The numerical example shows that the 
overall eﬀect can go in either direction.
Result 6. The lowest inﬂ  ation rate that can be attained with a strictly positive 
nominal domestic interest rate is greater when foreign currency circulates than 
when only domestic currency is used. However, when currency competition is 
greater, that inﬂ  ation rate is lower. The assumption that the real interest rate 
equals the rate of time preference,  , implies that the nominal interest rate 
on peso- denominated bonds is ip    p    . Thus the peso inﬂ  ation rate must 
exceed –   for ip to be positive. This means that the overall inﬂ  ation rate must 
exceed  $   F(–    –   $)(–    –   $), or –     [1 –  F(–    –   $)]( $    ). Unless F(–    
–    $) equals 1 (or  $    , which would imply a nominal dollar interest rate 
of zero), this exceeds the lower bound of –    that occurs in the absence of 
multiple currencies. However, the more that households use pesos when peso 
inﬂ  ation is low (i.e., the greater is F[–    –    $]), the lower is the lower bound.
Finally, result 3 suggests the following.
Result 7. With multiple currencies, there is likely to be deﬂ  ationary bias. 
Addressing this issue formally would require extending the model. To see 
the intuition, however, suppose there are two countries in the world, and that 
one prefers lower inﬂ  ation than the other. Result 3 suggests that it will be less Globalization and Monetary Control    8 3
costly for the central bank that prefers low inﬂ  ation to push overall inﬂ  ation 
in its country down than for the central bank that prefers high inﬂ  ation to 
push its overall inﬂ  ation up. Thus, there is a force acting to make average 
inﬂ  ation in the world closer to the level preferred by the low- inﬂ  ation central 
bank than to that preferred by the high-  inﬂ  ation central bank.
Example
To illustrate these ideas (other than result 7), consider the case where F( ) 
is one minus a cumulative normal distribution with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of 5 percentage points. This implies that when the two 
inﬂ  ation rates are the same, half of transactions are conducted in each cur-
rency, and that if the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential is 5 percentage points, ﬁ  ve-  sixths 
of transactions are conducted in the lower inﬂ  ation currency. Thus, it implies 
a high degree of substitutability between the currencies.
Figure 1C.1 plots overall inﬂ  ation as a function of the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential. 
For simplicity, I normalize dollar inﬂ  ation to zero. Currency competition 
greatly constrains the ability of the domestic central bank to create inﬂ  a-
tion. Inﬂ  ation can be raised only 0.85 percentage points above dollar inﬂ  a-
tion; this occurs when the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential is 3.76 percentage points. In 
contrast, the presence of multiple currencies has little impact on the central 
bank’s ability to achieve low inﬂ  ation. As peso inﬂ  ation falls, households 
Fig. 1C.1  Overall inﬂ  ation as a function of the diﬀerence between peso and dollar 
inﬂ  ation (dollar inﬂ  ation normalized to zero)84    Michael  Woodford
move rapidly out of dollars, and so overall inﬂ  ation is determined mainly 
by peso inﬂ  ation.2
Figure 1C.2 shows the variance of relative prices as a function of overall 
inﬂ  ation (with dollar inﬂ  ation again normalized to zero). For positive inﬂ  a-
tion (i.e., inﬂ  ation above dollar inﬂ  ation), the variance of relative prices is 
rising with inﬂ  ation up to the maximum attainable inﬂ  ation rate, as shown by 
result 4. For negative inﬂ  ation, reductions in inﬂ  ation ﬁ  rst raise distortions 
(by increasing the diﬀerence in the opportunity cost to households of peso 
and dollar goods) and then lower them (by causing households to switch 
mainly into pesos).
An Extension
A natural extension of the model is to allow the fraction of prices posted 
in pesos and the fraction of goods purchased with pesos to diﬀer. For ex-
ample, some producers could post their prices in one currency but accept 
payment in either. One could model each fraction as a decreasing function 
2. The ﬁ  gure can be reinterpreted to show the lower bound on inﬂ  ation with and without 
currency competition. With multiple currencies (and  $   0), overall inﬂ  ation must exceed 
– F(– ) for iP to be nonnegative; with only domestic currency, it must exceed – . Thus if we 
measure –  on the horizontal axis, the solid line shows the lower bound on inﬂ  ation with cur-
rency competition, and the dashed line shows the lower bound without currency competition.
Fig. 1C.2  The variance of relative prices faced by households as a function of inﬂ  a-
tion (dollar inﬂ  ation normalized to zero)Globalization and Monetary Control    8 5
of the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential, with the functions now no longer necessarily 
the same. Redoing the analysis in this more complicated case is straight-
forward.
An interesting special case of the extended model arises when all transac-
tions are conducted in the lower inﬂ  ation currency, but not all prices are nec-
essarily posted in that currency. One situation where this would eﬀectively 
occur is when households can trade in foreign exchange markets costlessly 
and instantaneously. In this case, households hold only the lower inﬂ  ation 
currency, and buy the higher inﬂ  ation currency only the instant before using 
it to make purchases.
In this case, inﬂ  ation (the average rate at which posted prices are rising) 
continues to be given by      $   F( ) , where F( ) is now the fraction 
of prices quoted in pesos. However, because households no longer need to 
hold the high-  inﬂ  ation currency for a period to buy goods whose prices are 
posted in terms of that currency, they face the same eﬀective price for all 
goods. Thus, diﬀerential inﬂ  ation no longer produces distortions. However, 
result 1—the possibility of an upper bound to inﬂ  ation—still holds, as does 
result 6 about the lower bound to inﬂ  ation.
Which Measure of Inﬂ  ation Is the Central Bank Likely to Care about?
Is control of peso inﬂ  ation suﬃcient for the central bank to attain its 
objectives, or will it care about dollar inﬂ  ation as well? A ﬁ  rm answer to this 
question requires a full understanding of the welfare eﬀects of inﬂ  ation, 
which we do not have. Thus, I will merely oﬀer some preliminary comments 
about various forces that may aﬀect the central bank’s views about inﬂ  ation.
I see only one consideration for which control of peso inﬂ  ation is likely to 
be suﬃcient: nonindexation of the tax system. If the tax system is written in 
nominal terms, it is presumably in terms of domestic currency. Thus, to the 
extent the central bank is concerned about inﬂ  ation because it is concerned 
about the distortions arising from this nonindexation, control over peso 
inﬂ  ation is enough to allow it to achieve its objectives. In the model I have 
described, the central bank continues to have control over peso inﬂ  ation, 
although this comes with some costs if it chooses a level that diﬀers from 
dollar inﬂ  ation.
For other factors that inﬂ  uence the welfare eﬀects of inﬂ  ation, the central 
bank will almost certainly care about both peso and dollar inﬂ  ation. One 
cost of inﬂ  ation is that it makes money costly to hold even though it is cost-
less to produce, and so introduces ineﬃciency. In the model I have described, 
for example, inﬂ  ation makes it more costly for households to obtain goods, 
and so could distort their labor- leisure choices. With foreign currency circu-
lating in the country, some of these costs are determined by foreign central 
banks. Thus, the domestic central bank’s control over peso inﬂ  ation is not 
enough to give it full control over these costs.86    Michael  Woodford
A potentially more important consideration in the central bank’s choice 
of inﬂ  ation is that inﬂ  ation can grease the wheels of labor and goods markets 
by making the need for nominal wage and price cuts less common. For wages 
and prices that are quoted in terms of foreign currency, inﬂ  ation in terms 
of the domestic currency is not relevant. Thus, this is another case where 
the circulation of multiple currencies restricts the central bank’s ability to 
achieve its objectives.
Another consideration in the determination of optimal inﬂ  ation is that, 
since nominal prices are not continually adjusted, higher inﬂ  ation increases 
the relative price variability that arises as diﬀerent prices are adjusted at 
diﬀerent times. Again, what aﬀects welfare is not just inﬂ  ation in terms of 
domestic currency, but the various inﬂ  ation rates in terms of the diﬀerent 
currencies in which prices are quoted. Thus again, control of inﬂ  ation in 
terms of domestic currency is not enough.
Inﬂ  ation also aﬀects the chances that an adverse shock will put the central 
bank in a position where it wants to reduce the nominal interest rate to zero. 
Here I am not certain what to think, but my guess is that the news is mixed. 
On the one hand, if globalization proceeds to the point where multiple cur-
rencies are circulating in signiﬁ  cant quantities in a country, goods and ﬁ  nan-
cial markets are likely to be so integrated that domestic monetary policy will 
have powerful eﬀects via exchange rates rather than interest rates. Thus, the 
zero lower bound on the domestic interest rate is unlikely to matter much 
for the central bank’s responses to domestic shocks. On the other hand, with 
this type of economic integration and the use of multiple currencies within 
a country, a worldwide shock that pushed foreign nominal interest rates to 
zero would likely aﬀect the domestic economy, and the level of peso inﬂ  a-
tion would not aﬀect the chances of this occurring. Thus, it appears that 
control of peso inﬂ  ation does not give the central bank full control over the 
probability that a shock will push a nominal interest rate that matters to the 
economy to zero.
Finally, it has been suggested that high inﬂ  ation in eﬀect directly lowers 
utility, essentially because seeing prices rise makes people unhappy, or that 
inﬂ  ation can cause people to make suboptimal ﬁ  nancial plans because they 
have diﬃculty accounting for inﬂ  ation. Here the relevant inﬂ  ation rate is 
inﬂ  ation in terms of whatever units people use to think about prices and 
ﬁ  nancial plans. In an economy where many prices are quoted in units of for-
eign currency and many transactions are carried out using foreign currency, 
for at least some households those units are likely to be in foreign currency.
Conclusion
I have two main conclusions. First, I want to emphasize what I said at 
the outset, which is that this is an excellent chapter that should become the 
standard reference on globalization and monetary policy.
Second, there appears to be at least one important way that globalization Globalization and Monetary Control    8 7
could severely limit a central bank’s ability to achieve its goals. If globaliza-
tion proceeds to the point where a signiﬁ  cant fraction of prices are quoted 
in terms of foreign currency and a signiﬁ  cant fraction of transactions are 
conducted in foreign currency, the central bank is likely to lose some of its 
inﬂ  uence over overall inﬂ  ation, and this loss of inﬂ  uence is likely to matter 
for its ability to achieve its broader objectives.
This loss of inﬂ  uence is asymmetric: it is more costly for the central bank 
to raise inﬂ  ation above foreign inﬂ  ation than to lower it below, and raising 
it beyond some level may be impossible. Thus, the constraints that currency 
competition can create for central banks are not altogether bad: to the extent 
that some central banks’ pursuit of higher inﬂ  ation than their neighbors is 
undesirable (resulting from such factors as misguided views about the ben-
eﬁ  ts of loose monetary policy, political pressures, and desires for seignor-
age), currency competition can impose useful discipline. But a country can 
also have legitimate reasons for wanting higher inﬂ  ation than its neighbors. 
For example, its institutions or history may make nominal wage or price 
cuts particularly diﬃcult, and so greasing-  the-  wheels considerations may 
make its optimal inﬂ  ation rate higher than its neighbors’. My general point 
is that currency competition has the potential to prevent central banks from 
accomplishing some things they were previously able to. Whether this is 
good or bad depends on how well central banks were using the powers that 
become limited by globalization.
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